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MARSHALLING THE EVIDENCE 
In claiming that Commercial Carriers did not marshal the 
evidence on the two findings of the Board it disputes, Mr. Judd 
makes much of the "amazing" circumstance that Commercial Carriers 
did not use any record cites to the Board's thirteen paragraphs 
of factual findings. Actually, Commercial Carriers frequently 
cites to these paragraphs, located at R. 50-1. (Appellant's 
Brief, pp. 3, 5, 8, 17). At any rate, Judge Allen's factual 
findings are the same as the Board's (with two exceptions), and 
Commercial Carriers simply chose to cite Judge Allen's Order 
rather than the Board's when referring to particular factual 
findings. Thus, the substance of Paragraphs 1-5 and 13 of the 
Board's findings of fact as adopted from Judge Allen is cited on 
Page 3 of Commercial Carrier's brief; Paragraphs 6-8 and 10-11 on 
Page 4; and Paragraph 12 on Page 5. Commercial Carriers did not 
fail to marshal the evidence merely because it did not 
consistently cite to record pages covering the Board's Order when 
cited pages of Judge Allen's Order contained the same 
information. 
Instead of a duty to cite superfluous record pages, 
Commercial Carriers had a duty only to marshal evidence in 
support of those factual findings it disputed. Commercial 
Carriers identified two such findings, that Mr. Judd checked his 
truck after stopping in Fort Kearney, and that the fight arose 
from efforts to protect his truck. Regarding the first finding, 
Mr. Judd points to a statement in the police report by his co-
worker Mr. Coyle that they checked their trucks some time before 
the fight, while they were still in the bar. (R. 295). There is 
no other mention in the record to this effect; neither Mr. Judd 
nor Mr. Coyle testified that they checked their trucks after 
stopping in Fort Kearney. (R. 110, 147-158). Judge Allen 
apparently did not feel such a finding was warranted after 
observing the demeanor and credibility of Mr. Coyle at the 
hearing. Even if it were true that Mr. Judd checked his truck 
early in the evening, this fact does nothing to demonstrate that 
Mr. Judd was in the course of his employment when he was injured 
hours later. 
The more significant disputed factual finding is the Board's 
inference that the fight arose from Mr. Judd's efforts to protect 
his truck. Commercial Carriers noted the difficulty of 
marshalling evidence in support of this inference because the 
Board did not explain how it was reached. (Brief of Appellant, 
p. 9). Nonetheless, after examining the entire record, 
Commercial Carriers gathered the subsidiary facts the Board 
conceivably might have relied upon in making its inference. 
(Appellant's Brief, p. 10 n.3, 12). It contrasted these few 
facts with the ample evidence relied upon by Judge Allen in 
making his opposite inference to show that the substantial weight 
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of the evidence supported Judge Allen's inference.1 (Appellant's 
Brief, pp.13-14). 
Finally, Commercial Carriers does not question, as Mr. Judd 
claims it does, that the Board is the ultimate fact finder. 
Neither does it desire, as Mr. Judd claims it does, that this 
Court ignore the Board's findings of fact; since Commercial 
Carriers accepts all but two of the Board's findings of fact, it 
would be self-destructive to urge their wholesale rejection. 
Commercial Carriers simply disagrees with the Board's inference 
that the fight arose from Mr. Judd's efforts to protect his 
truck. While the Board was the ultimate fact finder on this 
inference, it still was obliged to support this inference with 
substantial evidence and to explain its rejection of Judge 
Allen's opposite inference. It failed to do this, and Commercial 
Carriers requests this Court to reinstate Judge Allen's inference 
that the fight was personal because that inference is supported 
by substantial evidence. 
Commercial Carriers has met its burden of marshalling the 
evidence on the two factual findings it disputes. It met this 
burden despite the Board's refusal to indicate why, based upon 
the same subsidiary facts, it reached an opposite inference from 
Judge Allen regarding the cause of the fight. 
*Even though Mr. Judd claimed that Judge Allen's inference 
was not justified, he still conceded that it was a "rational 




THIS COURT SHOULD REJECT THE BOARD'S 
INFERENCE ON THE CAUSE OF THE FIGHT 
BECAUSE IT IS UNSUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL 
EVIDENCE. 
The Board's determination that Mr. Judd's injuries arose out 
of his employment hinged upon its inference that the fight was 
work-related and not personal. Its "evidence" for this inference 
consists of the conclusory statements that "the Board finds no 
basis to conclude that Judd's beating was the outgrowth of a 
dispute over the women at the bar"; "the fight resulted from Judd 
and Coyle's efforts to keep the other men away from the trucks," 
The Board does not follow these bare statements with a summary of 
the evidence that might sustain them, nor does it attempt to tie 
them to any of the factual findings. 
While the Board is the ultimate fact finder in workmens' 
compensation cases, it cannot draw facts out of the air. This 
Court can reverse the Board if a key factual finding does not 
derive from substantial evidence based upon the record as a 
whole. Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-16(4)(g). 
A. Judge Allen's Inference That The Fight Was Personal Is 
Sustained By The Weight Of Evidence. 
Because the substantial evidence standard requires reviewing 
courts to view the record as a whole, the findings of the hearing 
examiner, an integral part of the record, must always be 
considered. U.S. Steel Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n., 607 P.2d 
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807, 810 (Utah 1981). The hearing examiner's findings become 
more important to assessing substantial evidence in cases where 
the Board rejects those findings because 
evidence supporting a conclusion may be less substantial 
when an impartial experienced examiner who has observed the 
witnesses and lived with the case has drawn conclusions 
different from the Board's than when he has reached the same 
conclusion. 
Universal Camera Corp. v. Labor Bd.. 340 U.S. 474, 496 
(1951). 
Consideration of Judge Allen's factual inference reveals its 
close connection to the subsidiary facts. As indicated in 
Commercial Carriers' principal brief, Judge Allen's inference 
that the fight was personal differs from the Board's contrary 
finding since it draws on events occurring throughout the course 
of the entire evening rather than just the events occurring after 
Mr. Judd left the bar.2 Thus, the factual findings (also adopted 
by the Board) that Mr. Judd drank heavily in the bar, asked two 
women to join him and Mr. Coyle "to avoid the attentions of the 
two other younger men," and stayed with the women until after the 
bar closed, contribute to the ultimate inference that the fight 
was personal. If the Board's inference were accepted, these 
2
 Even if Mr. Judd's claim is to be believed that the 
atmosphere between the two truck drivers and the two young 
gentlemen with buck knives strapped to their waists (R. 296) was 
initially "chatty" at the bar (Appellee's Brief, p. 13), the 
events over the duration of the evening indicate that the 
camaraderie became clouded by alcohol and women. The night 
culminated in a hostile warning by Mr. Judd to stay away from all 
trucks in the parking lot and a threatening chase into the field, 
resulting in Mr. Judd's injuries. 
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factual findings become irrelevant, and there was no reason for 
the Board to reiterate them in its Order. Judge Allen's 
factual inference that the fight was personal is relevant to the 
determination of substantial evidence. His inference detracts 
from the Board's unsubstantiated inference that the fight was 
work-related because it is much more closely related to the 
subsidiary facts he made and the Board adopted. 
B. The Board's Failure to Explain Why It Rejected Judge 
Allen's Inference And Substituted Its Own Prevents This Court 
From A Meaningful Determination Of Whether Its Inference Was 
Based on Substantial Evidence. 
Balanced against Judge Allen's compelling inference that the 
fight was personal are the Board's bald statements that the fight 
was work-related. This Court cannot assess if the Commission's 
contrary inference is grounded in substantial evidence if it does 
not know what evidence, if any, the Commission relied upon, or 
the reasons for rejecting the evidence relied upon by Judge 
Allen. Adams v. Board of Review of Indus. Com'n., 821 P..2d 1, 6 
(Utah App. 1991) (when agency does not disclose logic for 
reaching particular factual finding, impossible to challenge 
logic on review). 
In Deschutes County v. Employment Division, 728 P.2d 950 
(Or.App. 1986), the court recognized the difficulty in attempting 
meaningful judicial review after the Employment Board adopted its 
hearing examiner's findings of fact but reached a different 
conclusion without explanation. Observing that the Employment 
Board must fully explain why the facts led to its conclusion for 
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meaningful judicial review, the court ruled that the Board's 
unsupported conclusion was not rationally related to its decision 
to award the applicant benefits. Id. at 952-3. 
Similarly, the Commission in this case dismissed a crucial 
factual inference of its hearing examiner but did not mention any 
evidence for its inference, rendering the exercise of determining 
substantial evidence futile. See Brock v. L.E.Myers Co,. 818 
F.2d 1270 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. den. 484 U.S. 989 (when an 
administrative body reverses findings of fact of hearing 
examiner, must state reasons for so doing or Commission's 
contrary conclusion is not supported by substantial evidence) 
(attached as "Addendum 9"); Beaty v. Minnesota Bd. of Teaching. 
354 N.W.2d 466 (Minn. App. 1984) (decision of administrative 
agency contradicting hearing examiner's decision arbitrary and 
capricious without supportive evidence) (attached as "Addendum 
10"); St. Vincent's Hospital v. Finley, 380 A.2d 1152 (N.J. App. 
1977) (administrative determination which does not specifically 
explain its rejection of a contrary finding of a hearing officer 
is vulnerable on judicial review) (attached as "Addendum 11"). 
Although Commercial Carriers guessed what evidence the Board 
might have considered in reaching its inference that the fight 
was work-related for the sake of marshalling the evidence, it is 
uncertain what evidence, if any, the Board actually considered or 
whether the evidence was substantial. On the other hand, Judge 
Allen's supported inference that the fight was personal is 
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relevant in assessing whether the Commission reversed that 
inference with substantial evidence. Because there is 
substantial evidence to support Judge Allen's finding, Commercial 
Carriers requests this Court to reinstate it. 
POINT II 
MR. JUDD'S FIGHT DID NOT ARISE IN 
THE COURSE OF HIS EMPLOYMENT BECAUSE IT DID NOT 
OCCUR WITHIN THE TIME, SPACE AND WORK-RELATED BOUNDARIES 
OF HIS EMPLOYMENT. 
For an injury to arise in the course of one's employment, it 
must fall within the time, space, and work-related boundaries of 
employment. (R. 54). The Board did not demonstrate that Mr. 
Judd's injuries fell within any of these boundaries. 
Mr. Judd was not within the time boundaries when the fight 
occurred because his logbook indicates that he went off duty at 
6:30 p.m. on the night he sustained his injuries. Moreover, even 
if this Court accepts the Board's factual finding that he checked 
his truck earlier that evening, he was still off duty when the 
fight occurred several hours later. He did not fall within the 
space boundaries because he abandoned Commercial Carrier's 
property, the truck, when he decided to chase the two men thirty 
yards into a field. His injuries were not work-related since 
Commercial Carriers never authorized him to pursue vandals. 
With the facts decidedly against him, Mr. Judd resorts to 
inapposite caselaw in the hope of lending his position authority. 
He cites M&K Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n., 189 P.2d 132 (Utah 
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1948), for the proposition that an employee is injured in the 
course of his employment if injured while rendering services he 
was hired to do at the time and place authorized. The crucial 
distinction here is that Mr. Judd was not hired to fight over 
women, nor was he hired to pursue supposed vandals thirty yards 
into a field. Commercial Carriers never authorized Mr. Judd to 
deal with vandalism on his own, alcohol-induced terms, and he 
acted outside his scope of employment in so doing. 
Mr. Judd also touts Martinez v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd., 
544 P.2d 1350 (Cal. 1976), as a case with "strikingly similar 
facts" to this case. One striking difference is that the 
applicant in Martinez prevailed on the emergency doctrine, 
permitting employees in certain instances to receive benefits if 
they are injured while protecting employer property on employer 
premises in emergency situations. Mr. Judd has never raised this 
doctrine before as a basis for benefits and cannot try to so 
characterize his injury on appeal. At any rate, the applicant in 
Martinez successfully asserted the emergency doctrine because the 
court determined it was reasonable that he would try to prevent 
theft of beer. Id. at 152. In this case, Commercial Carriers 
had instructed Mr. Judd to call the police and then the company 
in instances of vandalism. (R. 132, 165-66). It was not 
reasonable for Mr. Judd instead to pursue the fleeing vandals 
even though they were already "scared off." (R. 25). 
Additionally, it was not reasonable for Mr. Judd to pursue 
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vandals in a claimed attempt to serve his employer when he had 
placed himself off duty several hours before and was not 
responsible for performing work activities. Walls v. Industrial 
Com'n. of Utah, 857 P.2d 964, 970 (Utah App. 1993) (employer 
could not reasonably expect that employee would injure herself 
because she engaged in unauthorized activities hours after she 
went off duty).3 
The Board incorrectly determined that Mr. Judd's injuries 
arose within the time, space and work-related boundaries of his 
employment merely because he was a truck driver on assignment who 
checked his truck several hours before he got into a fight. 
Thus, even if this Court determines that the Board's unexplained 
inference regarding the cause of the fight was grounded in 
substantial evidence, there is an alternate basis for reinstating 
Judge Allen's Order. 
POINT III 
THE BOARD ABUSED ITS DISCRETION 
IN GRANTING A REQUEST FOR EXTENSION OF 
TIME THAT VIOLATED PROCEDURAL AND 
STATUTORY LAW. 
Mr. Judd does not dispute that his "Motion for 
Continence[sic] for Response to Appeal" failed to state cause for 
Maintenance Management, Inc. v. Tinkle, 570 P.2d 840 (Colo. 
App. 840), cited by Mr. Judd, provides that when an employer does 
nothing more to direct his employee than set general work hours, 
and the employer benefits from an employee's reasonable departure 
from schedule, ensuing injuries arise out of the course of his 
employment. As shown above, Mr. Judd's departure was not 
reasonable, and Maintenance Management is not controlling here. 
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an extension of time in violation of Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, Rule 6(b) and Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-l(9)• Neither 
does he dispute, as he cannot,4 that the Commission's granting of 
his defective motion was erroneous. Mr. Judd instead contends 
that the Commission's error was harmless to Commercial Carriers. 
Nonetheless, Commercial Carriers was substantially prejudiced by 
the Commission's perfunctory extension of time without heeding 
Rule 6(b) and §63-46b-l(9). 
A. The Commission's Error Harmed and Prejudiced Commercial 
Carriers Because It Led To A Changed Outcome of the Case. 
Mr. Judd notes that §63-46b-16(4) and Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, Rule 61, require a tribunal's error to be harmful and 
substantially prejudicial before this Court can grant relief. He 
acknowledges that an error is harmful and substantially 
prejudicial if there is "a reasonable likelihood that the error 
affected the outcome of the proceedings," yet does not attempt to 
prove that the Commission's error in this case had nothing to do 
with its subsequent reversal of Judge Allen's Order.5 
4Under the plain language of Rule 6(b) and §63-46B-l(9), the 
Commission can only grant an extension of time if the applicant 
shows good cause for the extension. See Holbrook v. Hodson, 466 
P.2d 843, 845 (Utah 1970) (court cannot extend time unless 
conditions stated in Rule 6(b) are met). 
5Mr. Judd contends that Ashton v. Ashton, 733 P.2d 147 (Utah 
1987), narrows the definition of substantial prejudice to being 
"deprived in some manner of a full and fair consideration of the 
disputed issues by the jury." He concludes that substantial 
prejudice did not occur here because the extension did not 
prevent Commercial Carriers from presenting additional testimony 
or adding to the record. (Brief of Appellee, p. 27). However, 
the Ashton court's restricted definition of "substantial 
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To the contrary, the Commission's disregard of the rules in 
this case permitted its entertainment of Mr. Judd's ultimately 
successful Motion for Review. Had the Commission properly 
treated Mr. Judd's defective motion for enlargement of time, it 
would have rejected the request for failure to comply with Rule 
6(b) and §63-46b-l(9). Mr. Judd would not have been entitled to 
agency review of Judge Allen's Order. Instead, Mr. Judd received 
an extra month to develop a case for reversal and the Commission 
subsequently reversed Judge Allen's Order. 
Commercial Carriers suffered additional prejudice because 
the extension of time ran contrary to prior agency practice. As 
discussed in Commercial Carrier's principal brief and as further 
developed below, the Commission has a practice of denying an 
extension of time to file a motion for review when a party fails 
to show good cause. Its contrary act of granting an extension in 
this case was arbitrary and prejudiced Commercial Carriers. See 
Scudder v. Kennecott Copper Corp.. 858 P.2d 1005, 1011 n.4 (Utah 
prejudice" was particularly suited to the facts before it because 
the plaintiff there had alleged substantial prejudice in the 
court's exclusion of evidence at a jury trial. In the context of 
an alleged harmful evidentiary error, the test for whether the 
error affected the outcome of the case was whether the error 
deprived the jury of evidence that was necessary for the jury's 
consideration of the issues. The Commission's harmful error in 
this case was not evidentiary in basis, so Ashton's specialized 
definition is inapplicable. The definition of harmless error is 
still an error "sufficiently inconsequential that we conclude 
there is no reasonable likelihood that the error affected the 
outcome of the proceedings." Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exchange, 
817 P.2d 789, 796 (Utah 1991) (citations omitted). 
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App. 1993) (court's inconsistent interpretation of contractual 
provision runs contrary to substantial justice under Rule 61). 
Since the Commission's indifference to the rules in this 
case resulted in an altered outcome, its error harmed and 
prejudiced Commercial Carriers. 
B. Mr. Judd Cannot Refute The Fact That The Commission's 
Error Ran Contrary To Prior Agency Practice. 
In Maverick Country Stores v.Industrial Comm'n., 860 P.2d 
944 (Utah App. 1993), the Commission exercised its practice of 
denying an extension of time to file a motion for review because 
the party did not show good cause. Mr. Judd tries to distinguish 
Maverick on the inconsequential factual difference that Maverick 
had asked for an extension the day after the time limit expired. 
However, the Commission did not deny the extension on that basis; 
it denied the extension because Maverick failed to show good 
cause. Maverick, 860 P.2d at 950. The Commission recognized and 
enforced the good cause requirement in Maverick but capriciously 
ignored it in this case, warranting this Court's nullification of 
Mr. Judd's untimely-filed Motion for Review under §63-46b-
16(4) (iii) . 
As supposed support for his contention that it is actually 
Commission practice to grant timely-filed requests for extensions 
regardless of whether the extensions comply with the rules, Mr. 
Judd cites Pease v. Industrial Comm'n. of Utah, 694 P.2d 613 
(Utah 1984), where the Commission treated a letter entitled 
"Motion for Review" as a timely-filed request for extension of 
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time. Id. at 614. Pease does nothing to establish that the 
Commission has granted extensions of time without good cause 
shown in prior instances and is not instructive. 
The requirement that an applicant requesting enlargement of 
time show good cause does not exist for an agency to disregard or 
recognize it at whim. The requirement is there to ensure that 
applicants provide justification for delaying the finality of a 
judgment. In this case, Judge Allen entered a judgment which 
would have become final the day after Mr. Judd filed his 
defective request for enlargement of time. Mr. Judd asked for 
more time to challenge the judgment without showing why he 
deserved the extra time. It is impossible to justify the 
postponement of final judgment in this case because Mr. Judd 
never bothered to explain the delay. 
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF REQUESTED 
Mr. Judd has been unable to defend the Board's faulty 
decision on appeal. The Board's determination that Mr. Judd's 
late-night fight was caused by his employment lacks substantial 
evidence. Its position that the fight fell within time, space 
and work-related boundaries even though he was off-duty, away 
from company property, and in violation of company regulations is 
similarly untenable. Additionally, its arbitrary decision to 
grant Mr. Judd's defective request for extension of time resulted 
in a changed outcome of the case. For the above reasons, 
-14-
Appellant Commercial Carriers requests that this Court reverse 
the Board's Order and deny Appellee benefits. 
DATED this cJolflL day of September, 1994. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
P,B<^ 
le Swensen 
Julianne P. Blanch 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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ADDENDUM 9: 
Brock v. L.E. Myers Co.. 
818 F.2d 1270 (6th Cir. 1987) 
1270 818 FEDERAL REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
ed, Judge Spiegel, the United States Dis-
trict Judge who denied the petitions for 
habeas corpus, concluded that "a rational 
trier of fact could have found the element 
of intent present in this case" and could 
rationally have found the petitioners "ei-
ther guilty or not guilty." Judge Spiegel, 
in my view, was right. 
It is true that the crime—if it was a 
crime—was not a particularly heinous one, 
and the consequences of the conviction 
were severe; Mr. Tipton has spent a sub-
stantial period of time in prison, and al-
though Mr. Farr has not suffered that in-
dignity, the felony conviction led to the loss 
of his license to practice law. Judges can 
readily sympathize with someone like Mr. 
Farr, a certified member of "the company 
of educated men and women," and the 
temptation to be magnanimous here is hard 
to resist. As Judge Spiegel's decision cor-
rectly intimates, however, our role is a very 
limited one—and regardless of how we 
might have preferred to see the case decid-
ed at the criminal trial level, our sympa-
thies ought to be immaterial if the trial 
record contains evidence on which a ration-
al fact-finder could have concluded that the 
petitioners were guilty. We are not a 
court of first instance, and we are not even 
an Ohio court of error; our sole function is 
to determine whether the robbery convic-
tions violated the Due Process Clause of 
the United States Constitution. I can dis-
cern no such constitutional violation. 
If Mr. Tuccinardi had been a teller in a 
bank or a cashier in a supermarket, and if 
he had been confronted at his place of 
employment by someone threatening to 
"tear up" the place if he did not immediate-
ly make payment on a personal debt, surely 
it would have been no defense to a charge 
of robbery that the debt collector did not 
care whether the debtor paid with his own 
3. I attach no significance to the fact that the 
complaints by which the criminal proceedings 
weie initiated wcic signed by Mr. Tuccinardi, 
the man on the scene, rather than by his em-
ployer, of whose whereabouts we know nothing. 
It was Mr. Tuccinardi who sent for the police, 
and it was the police, according to their testimo-
ny at the probable cause hearing that resulted in 
Mr. Fatr's being bound over foi the grand jury, 
who took Mi. Tuccinaidi to the police station to 
sign the complaints. There was no reason for 
money or his employer's. That being so, I 
am not prepared to say that the debt collec-
tor has a constitutionally mandated defense 
if the debtor happens to occupy living quar-
ters somewhere on the premises where he 
works. If Mr. Tuccinardi had been a live-in 
domestic servant—a handyman or gardner 
occupying quarters at his employer's home, 
for example—1 do not see why, as a matter 
of law, the accident of his residence would 
have justified a taking of the employer's 
property. The facts of this case (which 
none of us can interpret with the authority 
of a trial judge who actually heard the 
testimony, of course) do not strike me as 
sufficiently different from those hypothe-
sized to justify the conclusion that the 
State of Ohio violated the Federal Constitu-
tion in convicting Messrs. Farr and Tipton 
of robbery.3 I would have affirmed the 
denial of the writs. 
William E. BROCK, Secretary of 
Labor, Petitioner, 
v. 
The L.E. MYERS COMPANY, HIGH 
VOLTAGE DIVISION, and Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Review Com-
mission, Respondents. 
No. 86-3215. 
United States Court of Appeals, 
Sixth Circuit. 
Argued March 20, 1987. 
Decided May 13, 1987. 
Occupational Safety and Health Re-
view Commission reversed an administra-
Mr. O'Neil, the owner of the pony keg, to sign a 
complaint after Mr. Tuccinardi had already 
done so, and it is not inconceivable that Mr. 
O'Neil (who was said to have owed Mr. Tucci-
nardi an indeterminate amount for ten days of 
work performed over the preceeding two or 
three weeks) could recoup his loss in any event 
by deducting fifty dollars from Mr. Tuccmardi's 
pay. No such recoupment could turn a robbery 
into a loan after the fact, however. 
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tive law judge's decision which had upheld 
citations issued against employer. The 
Secretary of Labor petitioned for review, 
contending that Commission's decision was 
not supported by substantial evidence and 
did not adequately articulate reasons for 
failing to credit findings of administrative 
law judge. The Court of Appeals, Ralph B. 
Guy, Jr., Circuit Judge, held that: (1) claim 
of unforeseeable employee misconduct is 
affirmative defense to be proved by em-
ployer after Secretary of Labor has made 
out prima facie case of violation of Occupa-
tional Safety Health Act, and (2) Commis-
sion's conclusion, after Commission chose 
to accept employer's evidence as to adequa-
cy of its written safety program while se-
lectively ignoring testimony which showed 
that program in practice was not only ig-
nored but actively disregarded, was not 
supported by substantial evidence. 
Reversed; petition granted. 
1. Labor Relations ®=»29 
Claim of unforeseeable employee mis-
conduct is affirmative defense to be proved 
by employer after Secretary of Labor has 
made out prima facie case of violation of 
Occupational Safety Health Act; disagree-
ing with Capital Electric Line Builders of 
Kansas v. Marshall, 678 F.2d 128 (10th 
Cir.); Pennsylvania Power and Light v. 
OSHRC, 737 F.2d 350 (3d Cir.). Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Act of 1970, § 2 et 
seq., 29 U.S.C.A. § 651 et seq. 
2. Labor Relations <a=*29 
In cases involving negligent behavior 
by supervisor or foreman which results in 
dangerous risk to employees under his or 
her supervision, such fact raises inference 
of lax enforcement and/or communication 
of employer's safety policy, for purpose of 
establishing violation of Occupational Safe-
ty and Health Act. Occupational Safety 
and Health Act of 1970, § 2 et seq., 29 
U.S.C.A. § 651 et seq. 
3. Labor Relations <^29 
Proper focus in employee misconduct 
cases under Occupational Safety and 
Health Act is on effectiveness of employ-
er's implementation of its safety program, 
and not on whether employee miscondu< 
that of a foreman as opposed to an emp 
ee. Occupational Safety and Health Ac 
1970, § 2 et seq., 29 U.S.C.A. § 651 et 
4. Labor Relations ®=»9.6 
Statutory duty to assure compli? 
with standards issued under Occupati 
Safety and Health Act includes obliga 
to prevent hazardous noncomplying 
duct by employees. Occupational Sa 
and Health Act of 1970, § 2 et seq. 
U.S.C.A. § 651 et seq. 
5. Labor Relations <®=>29 
Secretary of Labor makes out pi 
facie case of employer's awareness of 
tentially preventable hazard upon intro 
tion of proof of employer's failure to 
vide adequate safety equipment or to p 
erly instruct its employees on neces 
safety precautions. Occupational Sa 
and Health Act of 1970, §§ 2 et seq., 5( 
2), 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 651 et seq., 654(a)(l 
6. Labor Relations <s=29 
After Secretary of Labor makes 
prima facie case, under Occupational ^ 
ty and Health Act, of employer's av 
ness of intentionally preventable has 
employer may defend citation on gr< 
that, due to existence of thorough and 
quate safety program which is comn 
cated and enforced as written, conduc 
employees in violating policy was idios 
ratic and unforeseeable; employer 
wishes to rely on presence of effe< 
safety program to establish that it c 
not reasonably have foreseen the aber 
behavior of its employees must dei 
strate that program's effectiveness in ] 
tice as well as in theory. Occupat 
Safety and Health Act of 1970, § 2 et 
29 U.S.C.A. § 651 et seq. 
7. Administrative Law and Proce 
<®=>513 
Labor Relations <s=>29 
When Occupational Safety and H< 
Review Commission reverses factual 
ings of administrative law judge, who 
unique opportunity of observing deme 
of witnesses and accepting or reje< 
their testimony based on those obs< 
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tions, Commission must articulate reasons 
for its failure to credit those findings. Oc-
cupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 
§ 11(a), 29 U.S.C.A. § 660(a). 
8. Labor Relations <s^31 
Occupational Safety and Health Re-
view Commission's conclusion, reversing 
administrative law judge's decision which 
had upheld citations against employer, was 
not supported by substantial evidence; 
Commission chose to accept employer's evi-
dence as to adequacy of its written safety 
program while selectively ignoring testimo-
ny which showed that program in practice 
was not only ignored but actively dis-
regarded. Occupational Safety and Health 
Act of 1970, § 11(a), 29 U.S.C.A. § 660(a). 
Sandra Lord (argued), Asst. Counsel for 
Appellate Litigation, Office of the Sol., U.S. 
Dept. of Labor, Washington, D.C., for peti-
tioner. 
John M. Kunst, Jr., Cincinnati, Ohio, 
Gary E. Becker (argued), for respondents. 
Before ENGEL and GUY, Circuit 
Judges, and PECK, Senior Circuit Judge. 
RALPH B. GUY, Jr., Circuit Judge. 
The Secretary of Labor petitions this 
court for review of an order of the Occupa-
tional Safety* and Health Review Commis-
sion reversing the administrative law 
judge's (ALJ) decision, which had upheld 
citations issued against L.E. Myers Compa-
ny (Myers). The Secretary contends that 
the Commission's decision is not supported 
by substantial evidence and did not ade-
quately articulate its reasons for failing to 
credit the findings of the ALL We agree 
and hereby reverse. 
I. 
This action arises from an inspection con-
ducted by a compliance officer of the Occu-
pational Safety and Health Administration 
1. A serious violation is deemed to exist "if there 
is a substantial probability that death or serious 
physical harm could result from a condition 
which exists, or from one or more practices, 
means, methods, operations, or processes which 
(OSHA) following the electrocution death 
of one of Myers' employees. Following the 
inspection, OSHA issued several citations 
charging Myers with both serious and non-
serious violations of the Occupational Safe-
ty and Health Act of 1970 (the Act). 29 
U.S.C. § 651 et seq. However, the Secre-
tary appeals only the Commission's ruling 
with respect to the citation for "serious" ' 
violation of 29 C.F.R. § 1926.28(a), and we 
will confine our discussion to that issue 
only. Section 1926.28(a) provides: 
§ 1926.28 Personal protective equipment, 
(a) The employer is responsible for re-
quiring the wearing of appropriate per-
sonal protective equipment in all opera-
tions where there is an exposure to haz-
ardous conditions or where this part indi-
cates the need for using such equipment 
to reduce the hazards to the employees. 
The citation alleged that Myers had com-
mitted a serious violation by exposing em-
ployees working without safety belts or 
other fall protection to a potential fall of 75 
feet. 
The investigation ensued as the result of 
an accident in which one employee was 
killed and another was seriously injured at 
a construction project near Cincinnati oper-
ated by High Voltage Systems, a wholly-
owned division of Myers which constructs 
and installs electrical transmission and dis-
tribution equipment. The project required 
Myers' employees to install rubber cover-
ing as insulation on a 13.2 kilovolt ener-
gized electrical wire in a congested con-
struction area where Emery Industries, 
which had contracted with Myers to per-
form the insulation work, was building an 
addition to a boiler house. The electrical 
lines ran a distance of 85 feet between a 
terminal pole and a tower located atop the 
boiler house. The terminal pole was about 
47 feet high, the roof of the boiler house 
was about 60 feet from ground level, and 
the top of the tower was about 80 feet 
from the ground. 
have been adopted or are in use, in such place 
of employment unless the employe! did not, and 
could not with the exercise of reasonable dil-
igence, know of the presence of the violation." 
29 U.S.C. § 666(k). 
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Although the preferred method of per-
forming this operation called for deadening 
the high-voltage power lines, Emery re-
fused to do so, whereupon James Kevelder, 
Myers' district manager for the Cincinnati 
area, consulted with Robert Sayre, a 
Myers' foreman, about alternate methods 
for performing the job. It was finally de-
cided to attempt the job from the roof of 
the boiler house building by standing a 
ladder on the roof against the electrical 
tower supporting the high-voltage wires 
and having a man mount the ladder and 
slide the rubber hose down onto the wires. 
No mention was made of the use of any 
specific protective equipment during this 
discussion. 
The foreman, Sayre, contacted James 
Carmac, a journeyman lineman, and Rus-
sell Miller, an apprentice lineman, to per-
form the job. James Carmac testified be-
fore the ALJ that he had asked Sayre if 
they needed to bring any tools or belts with 
them, and Sayre said, "No, you don't need 
nothing. All you need is a ladder that is in 
a shed there at the substation." The work 
commenced when Sayre, wearing no protec-
tive equipment other than rubber gloves, 
mounted the 28 foot extension ladder on 
the east side of the tower, and covered 
most of the energized areas with rubber 
blankets. He then took the rubber hose 
which was handed up to him by Carmac, 
who was standing on a lower rung of the 
ladder, and began to slip it over the wires. 
This procedure involved laying a section of 
hose over the top channel of the tower 
structure, reaching under the channel and 
over a diagonal brace, and feeding the in-
terlocking hose onto the line. As the 
weight of the hose increased, Sayre decided 
to balance the load by installing hose onto 
the opposite side. He accordingly dis-
mounted and the ladder was moved. Al-
though it appears that the ladder may have 
been "tied-off" while Sayre worked from it, 
Carmac testified that when it was moved, 
the rope was slack and it no longer ap-
peared to be secured. 
2. Rubber sleeves fit over the worker's arms and 
extend all the way to the shoulder area. 
At that point, Miller mounted the ladd 
to continue the procedure from the wc 
side of the tower as Sayre had previous 
been doing. Although Miller was wearii 
both rubber gloves as well as sleeve 
none of the three men were wearing 
safety belt or any other fall protecti 
equipment. A bystander, the manager 
another electrical construction firm wor 
ing at the Emery site, testified at the hes 
ing that observing Miller carrying out tr 
procedure was "like watching a guy stru 
gling on a tight rope, and we at that poi 
were debating whether we should holler 
the guy and tell him to get off the thing 
Shortly after he began performing tl 
work, Miller, without explanation or war 
ing, fell forward and struck an uncover* 
energized "pothead" or terminus for tl 
power lines. He was instantly electrocu 
ed, and continued falling until he struck t\ 
ground some 85 feet below. Carma 
standing on a lower ladder rung, fell bac 
ward onto the roof, suffering broken ril 
and other injuries. Sayre, who had bet 
observing from a corner of the roof, WJ 
unharmed. 
Following investigation of the acciden 
Myers determined that Sayre was subjei 
to discipline for failing to require the use ( 
any fall protection equipment, such as saf 
ty belts and lanyards. Use of such equi] 
ment on the Emery project was mandate 
by Myers own written safety booklet whic 
is distributed to all supervisory personne 
Sayre was placed on a two-week suspei 
sion without pay, from which he never n 
turned.3 
II. 
Myers contested the citation for violatio 
of 29 C.F.R. § 1926.28(a) on the groun 
that the violation was not chargeable to th 
company because it had a safety rule rt 
quiring the use of safety belts while work 
ing at elevated locations and, therefore, th 
failure to use belts in this instance wa 
unforseeable employee misconduct. 
3. Sayre was not presented to testify at the hcai 
ing and his current whereabouts are apparcntl 
unknown. 
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The evidence adduced at the hearing re-
vealed a safety program at Myers which 
looked good on paper but was routinely 
disregarded in practice in the Cincinnati 
district. The formal safety program con-
sisted of: (1) distribution of safety manuals 
to employees and supervisors, who were 
required to sign and return a receipt for 
the manuals; (2) regular safety "tailgate" 
meetings which were to be conducted by 
foremen at the worksite; (3) the filing of 
reports on such meetings with the district 
manager (here Kevelder); (4) individual 
pre-job discussions of safety matters; (5) 
worksite visits by a Myers Safety Supervi-
sor, headquartered in Chicago, whose terri-
tory covered the eastern third of the coun-
try; and (6) a progressive system of disci-
pline for safety infractions, normally imple-
mented by the district manager. Myers 
could produce no records showing receipt 
by either Carmac or Miller of their basic 
safety booklets nor for the manuals re-
quired for supervisory personnel, such as 
Sayre and Kevelder. No records were pro-
duced of any tailgate meetings conducted 
by Sayre, and Carmac reported that he 
could not remember when a safety meeting 
had last been held. Kevelder's secretary, 
Nancy Maher, testified that, prior to the 
accident, Sayre had not filed any safety 
reports. Following Miller's death, Kenneth 
Kesmeyer, HVS's manager out of Toledo, 
demanded copies of Cincinnati's safety re-
ports. Maher testified that Sayre repaired 
to a backroom with some pens, a calendar, 
and a copy of Myers "Tailgate Safety Meet-
ing Guides" and prepared several reports 
at once. 
Kevelder testified that, as district man-
ager, he did not get "actively involved" in 
the safety program and that it was very 
seldom necessary to have safety meetings 
unless something was "really out of the 
ordinary," although the company's Safety 
Supervisor, Robert Grandt, testified that it 
was the district managers who were re-
sponsible for training and enforcement of 
safety matters within their districts. Kev-
elder further admitted that there had been 
no specific discussion of safety matters pri-
or to the Emery job at issue, mainly be-
•L u u^ "mcnifinor TSavrp'sl intel-
ligence" to remind him to take normal safe-
ty precautions. However, as Carmac's tes-
timony revealed, Sayre specifically stated 
that no safety belts would be needed on the 
job and, indeed, he himself did not have his 
belt on nor did he tie-off while on the 
ladder as protection against a potential fall. 
Finally, OSHA's compliance officer testi-
fied that "The written program is a fairly 
effective and thorough program. It is not 
administered in that manner; therefore, I 
rated the program as being ineffective." 
The ALJ concluded that Myers "has 
made an effort to institute and implement a 
safety program of sorts. While this safety 
program appears on its face to be a worka-
ble program, the circumstances surround-
ing the actions of foreman Sayre on the 
day of the accident and prior thereto cast 
serious doubt that the program was effec-
tive with respect to the crews he super-
vised." He credited testimony showing 
that Sayre did not conduct tailgate safety 
meetings as mandated and that he "may 
have falsified reports in this regard." He 
also relied on Cannae's testimony that 
Sayre told him belts would not be needed 
as evidence of the fact that Myers' safety 
program "was not effectively communicat-
ed or enforced." Finally, he credited testi-
mony by Kevelder's secretary and a union 
representative to the effect that, shortly 
after the accident, Kevelder stated that he 
felt good linemen did not need safety belts 
because they just "get in the way." 
In reversing the findings of the ALJ, the 
Commission concluded that Myers' safety 
program was both adequate and effectively 
communicated to its employees, relying pri-
marily on testimony relative to the opera-
tion of the program as envisioned by the 
Safety Director's Office. They cited the 
compliance officer's testimony for the prop-
osition that Myers' employee training pro-
gram was not deficient, ignoring the rest 
of his testimony to the effect that the man-
ner in which it was actually carried out 
rendered it ineffectual. They further 
found that "Sayre was a good supervisor" 
despite the fact that there was testimony 
presented regarding two incidents on prior 
iobs which Sayre had supervised wherein 
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Sayre's judgment and attention to safety 
matters was called into question. No men-
tion was made of the conflicting testimony 
specifically credited by the ALJ. The Com-
mission concluded that the Secretary failed 
to sustain his burden of proving a violation 
of § 1926.28(a) and vacated the citation. 
III. 
The Secretary raises two issues on ap-
peal: 
1) whether the Commission erred in 
placing the burden of proof on the Secre-
tary to establish that the employee mis-
conduct was foreseeable to the employer, 
and 
2) whether the Commission's decision 
is supported by substantial evidence 
where it failed to articulate any reasons 
for discrediting evidence relied on by the 
ALJ and ignored evidence relative to the 
actual enforcement and communication 
of Myers' safety program to its employ-
ees. 
We address these issues seriatim. 
A. The Burden of Proof. 
The Occupational Safety and Health 
Act's stated purpose is to provide "so far 
as possible every working man and woman 
in the Nation safe and healthful working 
conditions " Whirlpool Corp. v. Mar-
shall, 445 U.S. 1, 12, 100 S.Ct. 883, 890, 63 
L.Ed.2d 154 (1980). Its purpose is neither 
punitive nor compensatory, but rather for-
ward-looking; i.e., to prevent the first acci-
dent. Mineral Industries & Heavy Con-
struction Group, v. OSHRC, 639 F.2d 
1289, 1294 (5th Cir.1981). To implement 
the statutory purpose, Congress imposed 
4. This court has held that "§ 1926.28(a) requires 
an employer to require the wearing of appropri-
ate safety equipment by his employees whenev-
er a reasonably prudent employer, concerned 
with the safety of his employees, would recog-
nize the existence of a hazardous condition and 
protect against that hazard by the means speci-
fied in the citation." Ray Evers Welding v. Oc-
cupational Safety, 625 F.2d 726, 731 (6th Cir. 
1980). However, that case arose prior to the 
Commission's invalidation of the disjunctive 
version of the regulation. 
5. § 1926.105 Safety nets. 
dual obligations on employers to c( 
both with a "general duty clause" r< 
ing that the employer free the workpli 
all recognized hazards, 29 1 
§ 654(a)(1), and a "special duty cl 
which requires compliance with mane 
occupational safety and health star 
issued by the Secretary, 29 1 
§ 654(a)(2). In this case, Myers is ch 
with a breach of the special duty clai 
its violation of the standard set forth 
C.F.R. § 1926.28(a). This standard 
dates that an employer shall requii 
wearing of appropriate personal prot 
equipment in all situations where a 
ployee is both exposed to a hazardou 
dition and the need for such prot 
equipment is indicated elsewhere ir 
1926. Although the current version 
standard uses the disjunctive "or" w 
spect to these separate clauses, its oi 
version used the conjunctive "and" t 
cate that both conditions must be sal 
The Commission held that the chai 
"or" was invalidly promulgated by tl 
retary and required reinstatement 
prior interpretation mandating tha 
conditions be met, and the Secreta 
pressly declined to challenge that ru 
appeal. Therefore, our analysis w 
ceed by taking as a given that a viola 
both parts of § 1926.28(a) must be p 
Although Myers does not conte 
facts that neither the foreman, Say 
Carmac and Miller were wearing 
belts, that such belts would have b< 
propriate fall protection on the Erne 
that risk of a fall was a recognized 
attendant upon a job performed 1 
ladder over 75 feet above ground \e\ 
that § 1926.105(a)5 "indicates the 
(a) Safety nets shall be provide 
workplaces are more than 25 feet al 
ground or water surface, or other 
where the use of ladders, scaffolds, cs 
forms, temporary floors, safety lines, 
belts is impractical. 
Although this standaid explicitly refer; 
"Safety nets," the Commission as well a 
courts of appeals have interpreted this 
to include safety belts as well as the otl 
items as appropriate means of fall pr 
See Southern Colorado Prestress Co. v. 
586 F.2d 1342, 1350 (10th Cir.1978); Bt 
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for protective equipment where the "work-
place is more than 25 feet above the 
ground," 6 Myers nevertheless argues that 
these facts are insufficient to prove the 
Secretary's case. They contend that, since 
it is clear that Congress did not intend 
employers to be insurers against all acci-
dents, but only those which are preventa-
ble, that when an employer alleges the 
existence of a comprehensive safety pro-
gram which renders noncompliance unfor-
seeable, the Secretary carries the burden of 
proving the insufficiency of that program. 
We disagree. 
[1] As Myers points out, there is a split 
among the circuits with respect to this 
question. Several circuits have held that 
an allegation of unforseeable employee 
misconduct constitutes an affirmative de-
fense to be pleaded and proved by the 
employer. See, e.g., Forging Industry 
Ass'n v. Secretary of Labor, 773 F.2d 1436, 
1450 (4th Cir.1985) (en banc) (unforseeable 
employee misconduct constitutes an affirm-
ative defense); Daniel International 
Corp. v. OSHRC, 683 F.2d 361, 363 (11th 
Southern Contractors Service, 492 F.2d 498 (5th 
Cir.1974). 
6. Myers puts forth an argument in this regard 
that we must address. They contend that 
§ 1926.105(a) should be read only to require an 
employer to utilize either a safety net or any 
other enumerated safety device—including a 
"safety belt" or a "ladder." Therefore, they ar-
gue, since Myers undisputedly provided a ladder 
upon which the involved employees could 
stand, the ladder itself was sufficient fall protec-
tion and no other safety equipment was mandat-
ed. 
The Commission itself has acknowledged that 
§ 105(a) "is not satisfied simply by the use of 
one of the devices listed in that section without 
regard to whether such use provides adequate 
fall protection to employees." National Indus. 
Conductors, Inc., 90 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1871, 
1872 (Rev.Comm'n 1981). See also Brock v. 
LR. Willson <& Sons, Inc., 773 F.2d 1377, 1384 
(D.C.Cir.1985) (device used must be capable of 
providing protection against the type of hazard 
to which employees are exposed). Moreover, in 
its brief to the Commission, Myers specifically 
conceded that safety belts should have been 
used on this project. 
7. Despite the Pennsylvania Power & Light 
court's holding, it also stated that "[i]n cases 
where the Secretary proves that a company su-
pervisor had knowledge of, or participated in, 
Cir.1982) (same); H.B. Zachry Co. v. 
OSHRC, 638 F.2d 812, 818-19 (5th Cir. 
1981) (same); General Dynamics Corp. v. 
OSHRC, 599 F.2d 453, 458 (1st Cir.1979) 
(employer may defend by showing it took 
all necessary precautions to prevent occur-
rence of violation); Danco Construction 
Co. v. OSHRC, 586 F.2d 1243, 1246 (8th 
Cir. 1978) (employer bears burden of estab-
lishing affirmative defense of unforseeable 
employee misconduct). Other circuits place 
the burden of disproving unforseeable em-
ployee misconduct on the Secretary. See 
Capital Electric Line Builders of Kansas 
v. Marshall, 678 F.2d 128 (10th Cir.1982); 
Pennsylvania Power and Light v. 
OSHRC, 737 F.2d 350, 357 (3d Cir. 1984) 
(Secretary bears the burden of proving that 
supervisor's failure to comply with stan-
dard was forseeable).7 We are persuaded 
that the appropriate resolution of this ques-
tion is to regard a claim of unforseeable 
employee misconduct as an affirmative de-
fense to be proved by the employer after 
the Secretary has made out a prima facie 
case of a violation of the Act. 
conduct violating the Act, we do not quarrel 
with the logic of requiring the company to come 
forward with some evidence that it has under-
taken reasonable safety precautions." More-
over, we observe that the court's conclusion was 
predicated on the presence of an adequate safe-
ty program and the unblemished safety record 
of the involved supervisor. 
We also observe that the Tenth Circuit has 
itself issued a conflicting case in Austin Bldg. 
Co. v. OSHRC, 647 F.2d 1063 (10th Cir.1981). 
In Austin, the court held: 
The Secretary has the burden of showing that 
the employer knew or, with the exercise of 
reasonable diligence, could have known of the 
likelihood of the noncomplying condition or 
practice. The employer may defend by show-
ing that the violation was an unforseeable 
occurrence. Evidence that the employer ef-
fectively communicated and enforced safety 
policies to protect against the hazard permits 
an inference that the employer justifiably re-
lied on its employees to comply with the ap-
plicable safety rules and that violations of 
these safety policies were not forseeable or 
preventable. 
Id. at 1067-68 (emphasis added). See generally 
Annotation, Employee Misconduct as Defense to 
Citation, Issued Pursuant to O.S.H. Act, Arising 
Out of Alleged Violation of Standards Resulting 
in Death or Personal Injury of Employee, 59 
A.L.R.Fed. 395 (1982). 
BROCK v. L.E. MYERS CO., HIGH VOLTAGE DIV. 
Cite as 818 F.2d 1270 (6th Cir. 1987) 
12' 
[2-5] In cases involving negligent be-
havior by a supervisor or foreman which 
results in dangerous risks to employees 
under his or her supervision, such fact rais-
es an inference of lax enforcement and/or 
communication of the employer's safety 
policy. National Realty and Construc-
tion Co., Inc. v. OSHRC, 489 F.2d 1257, 
1267 n. 38 (D.C.Cir.1973). See also Dono-
van v. Capital City Excavating Co., Inc., 
712 F.2d 1008, 1010 (6th Cir.1983) (actions 
of supervision are imputed to the compa-
ny). However, the proper focus in employ-
ee misconduct cases is on the effectiveness 
of the employer's implementation of its 
safety program and not on whether the 
employee misconduct is that of a foreman 
as opposed to an employee. Congress has 
specifically imposed on the employer the 
"responsibility to assure compliance by his 
own employees. Final responsibility for 
compliance with the requirements of this 
Act remains with the employers." S.Rep. 
1282,91st Cong. 2d Sess. 10-11, reprinted in 
1970 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.News 5177, 
5182. The statutory duty to assure compli-
ance with standards issued under the Act 
includes the obligation to prevent hazard-
ous noncomplying conduct by employees. 
"[A]n instance of hazardous employee con-
duct may be considered preventable even if 
no employer could have detected the con-
duct, or its hazardous character, at the 
moment of its occurrence. Conceivably, 
such conduct might have been precluded 
through feasible precautions concerning 
the hiring, training, and sanctioning of em-
ployees." National Realty, 489 F.2d at 
1267 n. 37. Since the Act itself places upon 
the employer the responsibility of taking 
all reasonable steps to eradicate preventa-
ble hazards, "including imposing work 
rules, communicating the rules to employ-
ees, and providing training, supervision and 
disciplinary action designated to enforce 
the rules," Forging Industries, 773 F.2d at 
1450, the Secretary makes out a prima 
facie case of the employer's awareness of a 
potentially preventable hazard upon the in-
troduction of proof of the employer's fail-
ure to provide adequate safety equipment 
or to properly instruct its employees on 
necessary safety precautions. See Bren-
nan v. OSHRC, 511 F.2d 1139, 1143 n. 
(9th Cir.1975) ("Proof of an employer's fs 
ure to provide guardrails, safety equ 
ment, instructions, or the like, would esta 
lish a prima facie case of an employe! 
knowledge of its own acts of omission. 
Danco Construction Co. v. OSHRC, 5 
F.2d at 1246 (employer may not "fail 
properly train and supervise its employe 
and then hide behind its lack of knowledj 
concerning their dangerous working prz 
tices."). 
[6] Thereafter, an employer may d 
fend the citation on the ground that, due 
the existence of a thorough and adequa 
safety program which is communicated ai 
enforced as written, the conduct of its er 
ployee(s) in violating that policy was idio 
yncratic and unforseeable. By its natur 
information with respect to the impleme 
tation of its written safety program will 1 
in the hands of the employer, and it is n< 
unduly burdensome to require it to con 
forward with such evidence. If the er 
ployer's evidence preponderates, it has su 
cessfully established the defense of unfo 
seeable employee misconduct. We emph 
size that the employer who wishes to rel 
on the presence of an effective safety pr< 
gram to establish that it could not reasoi 
ably have foreseen the aberrant behavic 
of its employees must demonstrate thj 
program's effectiveness in practice as we 
as in theory. 
B. Substantiality of the Evidence. 
[7] Factual findings of the Commissio 
are conclusive if supported by substantia 
evidence in the record as a whole. 2 
U.S.C. § 660(a). However, when the Conr 
mission reverses the factual findings of th 
ALJ, who had the unique opportunity o 
observing the demeanor of the witnesse 
and accepting or rejecting their testimon; 
based on those observations, the Commis 
sion must articulate reasons for its failun 
to credit those findings. Citizens StaU 
Bank v. FDIC, 718 F.2d 1440, 1444 (8tl 
Cir.1983); Brennan v. Gilles & Cotting 
Inc., 504 F.2d 1255, 1264 (4th Cir.1974 
(administrative agency must explair 
grounds for rejection of ALJ's disposition) 
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[8] In the case at bar, it is clear that 
the Commission chose to accept Myers' evi-
dence as to the adequacy of its written 
safety program while selectively ignoring 
testimony, credited by the ALJ, which 
showed that the program in practice, at 
least in Kevelder's district, and more spe-
cifically with respect to Sayre personally, 
was not only ignored but actively dis-
regarded.8 The Commission gave no rea-
sons for its failure to accept the factual 
findings made by the ALJ. Under these 
circumstances, we do not find the Commis-
sion^ conclusion supported by substantial 
evidence and it will therefore be RE-
VERSED. 
PETITION GRANTED. 







The Director, Office of Workers' Compen-
sation Programs, United States Depart-
ment of Labor, Respondent-Party in In-
terest. 
No. 86-3370. 
United States Court of Appeals, 
Sixth Circuit. 
Argued March 30, 1987. 
Decided May 19, 1987. 
Employer sought review of order of 
Benefits Review Board modifying a previ-
ous denial and awarding black lung bene-
fits to employee. The Court of Appeals, 
8. See, e.g., testimony establishing that, when 
asked if belts or other special equipment would 
be necessary, Sayre said "no". Further, Carmac 
testified that after he saw what the job entailed, 
Cornelia G. Kennedy, Circuit Judge, held 
that claimant for benefits under the Black 
Lung Benefits Act must file with a deputy 
commissioner, rather than an ALJ, a re-
quest for modification of an ALJ decision 
regarding entitlement to benefits. 
Vacated and remanded. 
Administrative Law and Procedure <s=492 
Labor Relations <s=*27 
Claimant for benefits under the Black 
Lung Benefits Act must file with a deputy 
commissioner, rather than an ALJ, a re-
quest for modification of an ALJ decision 
regarding entitlement to benefits. Federal 
Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, § 401 
et seq., 30 U.S.C.A. § 901 et seq.; Long-
shoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensa-
tion Act, § 22, as amended, 33 U.S.C.A. § 922. 
John G. Paleudis (argued), Hanlon, Duff 
& Paleudis, Co., L.P.A., St. Clairsville, 
Ohio, for petitioner. 
Daniel A. Manring (argued), Columbus, 
Ohio, Benefits Review Bd., Michael J. Den-
ney, Thomas L. Holzman, Office of the 
Solicitor, Ellen L. Beard (argued), U.S. 
Dept. of Labor, Washington, D.C., for re-
spondents. 
Before KEITH, KENNEDY and 
RYAN, Circuit Judges. 
CORNELIA G. KENNEDY, Circuit 
Judge. 
Saginaw Mining Company ("Saginaw") 
seeks review of an order of the Benefits 
Review Board ("the Board") modifying a 
previous denial and awarding black lung 
benefits to respondent-employee Antonio 
Mazzulli. Saginaw and the Director of the 
Office of Workers' Compensation Pro-
grams, United States Department of Labor 
("Director"), respondent-party in interest, 
contend that a claimant for benefits under 
the Black Lung Benefits Act, 30 U.S.C. 
§ 901 et seq. ("BLBA"), must file a request 
he "would have put a lanyard on if I had one." 
He had intentionally left his safety equipment at 
his other job site in reliance on Sayre's assur-
ance that it would not be necessary. 
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Beaty v. Minnesota Bd. of Teaching 
No. CX-83-1929 
Court of Appeals of Minnesota 
354N.W.2d466 
August 21, 1984 
PRIOR HISTORY: 
Certiorari to Minnesota Board of Teching Court, 
Reversed and remanded. 
SYLLABUS: 1. The Minnesota Board of Teaching's 
failure to apply equitable estoppel to the facts of this 
case is an error of law. 
2. The Minnesota Board of Teaching's decision to 
deny appellant's application for school psychologist li-
censure is arbitrary and capricious. 
COUNSEL: John R. Tunheim, 1700 First Bank Bldg, 
St. Paul Minnesota 55101, for appellant. 
Hubert H. Humphrey III Attorney General Darrell J 
Davis, Spec. Asst 1100 Bremer Tower, 7th Place and 
Minnesota St. St. Paul Minnesota 55101, for respon-
dent. 
JUDGES: Heard, considered and decided by Popovich, 
Chief Judge, Leslie, Judge, and Crippen, Judge. 
OPINIONBY: Popovich, C.J. 
OPINION: [*468] POPOVICH, Chief Judge 
This is an appeal from the order of the Minnesota 
Board of Teaching denying appellant's application for 
licensure as a School Psychologist I. Appellant claims 
(1) the Board's failure to apply equitable estoppel was an 
error of law, (2) the Board'd decision was arbitrary and 
capricious, and (3) the Board's decision was not sup-
ported by substantial evidence. We reverse and remand. 
FACTS 
Appellant has been employed for the past thirteen 
years as a counselor at the Marshall Middle School in 
Marshall, Minnesota. She has 20 years of experience in 
education and is licensed in elementary education, ele-
mentary counseling, middle school guidance and coun-
seling, secondary guidance and counseling, and middle 
school health. 
Appellant contacted Mankato State University 
(Mankato) regarding obtaining school psychologist 
training and on April 8, 1982, met with Dr. Ralph 
Kudella, and advisor. Kudella told appellant 
Mankato's school psychology training program was 
"pre-approved" and that official approval looked "very 
promising". Appellant and Dr. Kudella compared 
the transcript of appellant's coursework to the state 
licensure requirements and developed a plan for 
appellant to complete the requirements. 
On April 12, 1982, appellant called the State 
Department of Education and spoke with Kenneth 
Peatross, Executive Secretary of the Minnesota Board 
of Teaching (Board). Appellant inquired about the ap-
proval status of Mankato's school psychologist program. 
Peatross responded that St. Cloud State University and 
Mankato were competing to get approval for the school 
psychologist program but that Mankato was way ahead 
of St. Cloud. According to appellant, Peatross also 
stated he was sure Mankato would get approval for its 
program. Appellant testified she and Peatross discussed 
the advisability of taking courses at Moorhead State 
University rather than Mankato. According to appel-
lant, Peatross stated it would be much easier to go to 
Mankato since it is closer to Mashall than Moorhead 
and it was "safe" to take school psychologist courses at 
Mankato. Peatross testified he does not remember the 
specifics of the conversation, but it had never been his 
practice to advise completion of coursework in a pro-
gram not yet approved. 
In the summar of 1982, appellant attended Mankato 
and completed three of the courses prescribed by Dr. 
Kudella. During that same summer, Dr. Kudella de-




signed a practicum for appellant. From August, 1982 
through January, 1983, appellant completed [*469] the 
practicum under the direction of Henry Hanck, a li-
censed School Psychologist I employed by the Marshall 
School District. 
In February of 1983, having completed the course 
prescribed by Dr. Kudella, appellant contacted the 
Department of Education (Department) to obtain appli-
cation materials for licensure. She was referred to Dr. 
Thomas Lombard, an Education Program Supervisor 
with the Department of Education, who informed her 
Mankato had dropped its plan to develop a school psy-
chologist training program because of funding cutbacks. 
On February 8, 1983, appellant requested the 
Department review her qualifications. Dr. Lombard 
called appellant after the review and told her she would 
need to complete an additional six to nine courses to 
meet the requirements for a School Psychologist I li-
cense. Appellant submitted an official application to the 
Department of Education on February 23, 1983. She 
informed Peatross she was willing to take the courses 
required by Dr. Lombard and requested a list specifying 
the required courses. 
On March 7, 1983, George Droubie, Manager of 
Personnel Licensing and Placement for the Department, 
sent appellant notice of the denial of her licensing ap-
plication. The notice evaluated appellant's coursework 
and identified nine areas of graduate coursework appel-
lant had not completed. Appellant asked the Department 
to reconsider her application and submitted additional 
information about her coursework. After reconsidera-
tion, Dr. Droubie informed appellant that based on the 
additional information supplied by her, the Department 
revised its evaluation of appellant's required course-
work and found her work deficient in five subject areas. 
Appellant enrolled in three of the prescribed courses, but 
appealed the denial of her licensure, requesting a hear-
ing pursuant to Minn. Stat. §§ 14.57 to 14.63 (1983). 
On June 22, 1983, Peatross informed appellant that Dr. 
Droubie's letter of April 21, 1983 was an offer of set-
tlement and since appellant was continuing her appeal, 
the offer was withdrawn and appellant was required to 
start over in an approved program. 
On June 28, 1983, a hearing was held before hearing 
examiner Howard L. Kaibel. Following the hearing, 
the hearing examiner issued findings of fact, conclu-
sions of law and a memorandum recommending that the 
Board order the Department to issue appellant a School 
Psychologist I license upon successful completion of the 
courses in which she was enrolled and the November 
1983 Kaufman ABC Workshop. 
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The hearing examiner found Dr. Droubie's letter of 
April 21 was not a settlement offer and was admissible 
evidence. He further found equitable estoppel should 
be applied to prevent the Board from denying appel-
lant a license after it had advised her to take courses at 
Mankato and she had complied. Finally, the examiner 
found the Board has discretionary authority to grant a 
license to a "qualified" applicant even though the appli-
cant's courses were completed in a program not approved 
by the Department. 
Executive Secretary of the Board Peatross filed excep-
tions with the Board: The exceptions included proposed 
findings of fact, conclusions of law and an order. 
On October 19, 1983, the Board heard oral arguments. 
The Board rejected the hearing examiner's findings, con-
clusions and recommendation and adopted the findings, 
conclusions and order proposed by the executive secre-
tary. On December 5, 1983, appellant filed a petition 
for writ of certiorari. 
In March 1984, the Department asked appellant to sub-
mit information verifying she had completed any of the 
five required subject areas. Appellant provided informa-
tion which she contends verifies she completed all five 
areas. The Department concluded appellant completed 
only three of the five areas. The Department disputes 
completion of "Theories of Personality" and "Practicum 
in School Psychological Service". 
[*470] ISSUES 
1. Whether the Board's failure to apply equitable 
estoppel was an error of law? 
2. Whether the Board acted arbitrarily or capriciously 
in denying appellant's application for licensure? 
3. Whether the Board's decision denying appellant's 
application for licensure is supported by substantial ev-
idence? 
ANALYSIS 
1. Judicial review of administrative agency decisions 
is governed by the Minnesota Administrative Procedures 
Act, Minn. Stat. § 14.69 (1982) which provides: 
In a judicial review under sections 14.63 to 14.68, the 
court may affirm the decision of the agency or remand 
the case for further proceedings; or it may reverse or 
modify the decision if the substantial rights of the peti-
tioners may have been prejudiced because the adminis-
trative finding, inferences, conclusion, or decisions are: 
(a) In violation of constitutional provisions; or 
(b) In excess of the statutory authority or jurisdiction 
of the agency; or 
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(c) Made upon unlawful procedure; or 
(d) Affected by other error of law; or 
(e) Unsupported by substantial evidence in view of the 
entire record as submitted; or 
(f) Arbitrary or capricious. 
Id. 
Decisions of administrative agencies enjoy a presump-
tion of correctness "and will be reversed only when 
they reflect an error of law or when the findings are 
arbitrary and capricious or are unsupported by substan-
tial evidence." Crookston Cattle Co. v. Minnesota 
Department of Natural Resources, 300N.W.2d769, 777 
(Minn. 1981); see Reserve Mining Co. v. Herbst, 256 
N.W.2d808, 824 (Minn. 1977). When reviewing ques-
tions of law, however, the court is not bound by the 
agency's decision. Ekstedt v. Village of New Hope, 
292 Minn. 152, 164, 193 N.W.2d 821, 829 (1972). It 
is the function of the court in reviewing administrative 
agency decisions to settle questions of law. State ex rel. 
Spurck v. Civil Service Board, 226 Minn. 240, 248, 
32 N.W.2d 574, 580 (1948). Administrative agency 
decisions which are quasi-judicial in nature are more 
closely scrutinized than the quasi-legislative decisions 
which recive an extremely limited review on appeal. 
Arvig Telephone Co. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone 
Co., 270NW.2dlll, 116 (Minn. 1978). 
2. Initially, we consider whether the Board's failure to 
apply equitable estoppel was an error of law. For equi-
table estoppel, the plaintiff must demonstrate the defen-
dant, through language or conduct, induced the plaintiff 
to rely, in good faith, on this language or conduct to his 
injury, detriment or prejudice. Ridgewood Development 
Co. v. State, 294N.W.2d288, 292 (Minn. 1980). 
Traditionally, courts relied on the distinction between 
sovereign and proprietary activities in determining the 
applicability of estoppel against government agencies. 
Mesaba Aviation Division v. County of Itasca, 258 
N.W.2d 877, 879 (Minn. 1977). It had been the rule 
that estoppel was available for use against government's 
proprietary acts, but not available for use against its 
sovereign or governmental acts. See State v. Horr, 165 
Minn. 1, 4, 205 N.W. 444, 445 (1925). In Mesaba, 
the Minnesota Supreme Court abandoned the distinc-
tion, stating: 
Although the governmental-proprietary distinction 
might once have been a progressive test of the proper 
circumstances in which to stop the government, we no 
longer find it a useful tool for that purpose. The distinc-
tion is difficult to apply and is to some extent misleading. 
Mesaba, 258 N.W.2d at 880 (citations omitted). The 
court also said: 
The governmental-proprietary distinction, however, 
does reflect a relevant concern: the danger that estop-
pel will hinder government and frustrate public policy. 
The problem is that the distinction [*471] is not suffi-
ciently calibrated to implement that concern in every sit-
uation. Thus, the instant inquiry should not be whether 
the county's actions may be characterized as governmen-
tal or proprietary. Instead, the equities of the circum-
stances must be examined and the government estopped 
if justice so requires, weighing in that determination the 
public interest frustrated by the estoppel. . . . We do 
not envision that estoppel will be freely applied against 
the government. But if justice demands, estoppel can 
be applied against the government even when it acted 
in a sovereign capacity if the equities advanced by the 
individual are sufficiently great. 
Id. A balancing test is added to the general requirements 
of equitable estoppel when the government is sought to 
be estopped in its sovereign capacity. 
In this matter, appellant spoke with Kenneth Peatross, 
executive secretary of the Board, before pursuing the 
courses prescribed by Dr. Kudella. Her conversa-
tion with Peatross left her with the definite impression 
she would be able to fully complete the requirements 
for School Psychologist I licensure through Mankato. 
Pursuant to that belief, appellant expended a great deal 
of time and money completing the courses outlined by 
Dr. Kudella. 
Whether an administrative officer is authorized to 
make a representation is an important consideration 
in determining whether the government should be 
estopped. Mesaba, 258 N.W.2d at 879. Peatross is 
the Executive Secretary of the Board of Teaching. The 
Board has ultimate licensing authority and Peatross rou-
tinely handles licensure matters. Peatross was autho-
rized to recommend a school where one could fulfill the 
licensure requirements. 
3. Equitable estoppel may also arise from communica-
tions regarding appellant's application for licensure and 
appeal. In early 1983, Dr. Droubie and Dr. Lombard 
agreed to review appellant's qualifications to determine 
whether she might qualify for licensure. In his letter 
of April 21, 1983, Dr. Droubie stated appellant could 
meet the licensure requirements by completing five spe-
cific subject areas. Relying on this letter, appellant regis-
tered and completed four courses which satisfied three of 
the five areas. She also supplied a written endorsement 
certifying that she had completed a fourth requirement. 
When appellant did not drop her appeal of the orig-
inal license denial, the Board sought to characterize 




Droubie's April 21 letter as an offer of settlement. On 
June 27, 1983, Peatross informed appellant the offer was 
revoked and appellant was required to start over in an 
approved program. 
The Board erred by not applying equitable estoppel as 
the hearing examiner recommended. In reliance on rep-
resentations made by agents of the Board and Department 
authorized to make such representations, appellant in 
good faith expended a great deal of time and money pur-
suing a School Psychologist I license. The balancing test 
of Mesaba has been met. Applying estoppel against the 
government in this case will not frustrate any legitimate 
public purpose, while failing to apply it will result in 
great hardship to appellant. Justice demands the Board 
be estopped from not ordering the Department to grant 
appellant's application for licensure. 
4. The Board's decision denying appellant's licensure 
is also arbitrary and capricious. A decision of an ad-
ministrative agency is arbitrary and capricious when the 
determination represents the agency's will and not its 
judgment, or when the decision is without evidence to 
support its conclusion. Bryan v. Community State Bank 
ofBloomington, 285Minn. 226, 234, 172N.W.2d771, 
776 (1969). 
(a) In his April 21 letter, Dr. Droubie stated appellant 
could comply with the "Theories of Personalities" re-
quirement if she obtained an endorsement from the chair-
person of the psychology department at the University of 
Minnesota, Duluth (UMD) indicating this requirement 
had been met. Appellant obtained such an endorsement 
[*472] from Dr. Gum of UMD. The Board, however, 
now claims the endorsement is inadequate to satisfy the 
requirement. 
(b) The Board also maintains the practicum experience 
appellant received under Mr. Hanck does not meet the 
"Practicum in School Psychological Service" require-
ment because her work was not done under the super-
vision of a School Psychologist II. The Board cites no 
rule, however, which requires the practicum be done 
under a School Psychologist II. Even Minnesota Rule 
8700.6310, subpart 4(G)(2) (1983), effective July 1, 
1985, will not require supervision by a Level II school 
psychologist, nl 
nl Minnesota Rule 8700,6310, subpart 
4(G)(2)(1983) states in relevant part: 
(2) . . . The practicum shall be done on at least 
a half-time basis, and the principal supervision must 
be provided by a practicing school psychologist. A 
currently practicing school psychologist is defined 
as a fully licensed person working at least half-time 
in the practice of school psychology or the prepara-
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tion of school psychologists. Local supervision in a 
practicum setting may be provided by other psycho-
logical personnel. 
In his report, the hearing examiner found that 
applicant's practicum was designed and ultimately su-
pervised by [Dr. Kudella], a competent university pro-
fessor with a doctorate. It was locally supervised by a 
currently practicing school psychologist, fully licensed 
at Level I who was specifically approved by the univer-
sity professor. Licenses have been issued in the past to 
applicants whose practicum was supervised locally by 
level I psychologists. If Mankato had followed through 
with its accreditation, as planned, there would be no 
question as to the sufficiency of Applicant's practicum. 
(c) Additionally, upon review of appellant's qualifica-
tions, the Department advised appellant she could meet 
the licensure requirements by completing five subject 
areas. Then shortly before the examiner's hearing, the 
Board notified appellant this representation was only an 
offer of settlement which was being withdrawn because 
appellant continued with her appeal. Appellant had no 
prior indication that the representation was an offer of 
settlement. After withdrawing the so-called offer, the 
Board informed appellant she would have to enroll in an 
approved program and virtually start over. 
(d) We are also troubled by the Board's total disregard 
for the hearing examiner's report. The hearing exam-
iner found appellant demonstrated good faith reliance 
on representations made by the Executive Secretary of 
the Department and she had essentially complied with 
the requirements for licensure. He recommended ap-
pellant be licensed. The Board rejected the hearing ex-
aminer's findings without comment. Although agencies 
are not bound by a hearing examiner's findings, City of 
Moorhead v. Minnesota Public Utilities Commission, 
343 N.W.2d 843 (Minn. 1984), the hearing examiner's 
findings should not be taken lightly. When an agency 
rejects or significantly deviates from the hearing exam-
iner's findings, it should explain, on the record, its 
reasons for doing so. Failure to do so evidences the 
agency's desire to exercise its will and not its judg-
ment. A hearing examiner's report and recommenda-
tions should not be summarily rejected without reasons. 
5. While this matter also presented the issue whether 
the Board's decision is supported by substantial evi-
dence, in view of the preceding discussion and analysis 
it is unnecessary to fully discuss this issue. 
DECISION 
In denying appellant's application for licensure, the 
Minnesota Board of Teaching committed an error of law 
s«51 FYI<;-NFYI<;YS« 
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by failing to apply equitable estoppel. The Board's de- sue a School Psychologist I license to Mary Jo Beaty, 
cision represented its will, not its judgment, and is ar- appellant. 
bitrary and capricious. We reverse and order the Board ^ , 
*T u- * J A ^ -*. + cTiA *• * • Reversed and remanded, of Teaching to order the Department of Education to is-
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COUNSEL: Mr. Adrian M. Foley, Jr. argued the 
cause for appellant (Messrs. McElroy, Connell, Foley 
& Geiser, attorneys; Mr. E. Peter Connell on the brief). 
Mr. Douglass L. Deny, Deputy Attorney General, ar-
gued the cause for respondents (Mr. William F. Hyland, 
Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney). 
JUDGES: Bischoff, Kole and Gaulkin. The opinion of 
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OPINIONBY: GAULKIN 
OPINION: [*26] [**1153] St. Vincent's Hospital 
appeals from the denial of its application for a certifi-
cate of need by the Health Care Administration Board 
(HCAB) in the New Jersey State Department of Health 
(Department). N.J.S.A. 26:2H-7 et seq. 
The procedural history of the application is long and 
complex. St. Vincent's, a private Catholic "less than 
full service" hospital of 112 beds operated in Montclair 
since 1898, applied to the Department in May 1972 for 
a certificate [*27] of need permitting it to relocate to a 
200-bed full service hospital in West Caldwell. Before 
that application was acted upon, and based upon informal 
discussions with Department personnel, St. Vincent's 
withdrew its application and in November 1973 filed 
a new application for a certificate of need for a 100-
bed "less than full service" hospital in West Caldwell. 
Sometime thereafter Montclair Community Hospital, a 
122-bed hospital also located in Montclair, applied for 
a certificate of need to relocate to a 200-bed facility in 
that area of Essex County known as West Essex, where 
West Caldwell lies. 
In keeping with N.J.S.A. 26:2H-3 and 10, both St. 
Vincent's and the Montclair Community applications 
were submitted for review by the Hospital and Health 
Planning Council of Metropolitan New Jersey (the "B" 
agency), a comprehensive area-wide health planning 
agency. N.J.S.A. 26:2H-2(g). In conjunction with that 
review, the B agency initiated discussions between the 
hospitals to determine whether a merger of institutions or 
facilities might be effected. Those discussions proved 
abortive since St. Vincent's contended that theologi-
cal and philosophical differences between its Catholic 
institution and the nonsectarian Montclair Community 
were insurmountable. Thereupon, on March 27, 1974, 
the B agency recommended that St. Vincent's be is-
sued a certificate of need, giving as its essential reasons 
that (1) the contemplated facility would yield an actual 
decrease of 13 beds; [**1154] (2) the proposed less-
than-full care hospital would have an affiliation with St. 
Joseph's Medical Center for special services and (3) the 
estimated indebtedness of the hospital would be within 
the guidelines promulgated by the Department. At the 
same time, the B agency recommended denial of the 
Montclair Community application. 
Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 26:2H-10 and N.J.A.C. 8:33-
2.4, the St. Vincent's application was forwarded for 
review by the State Health Planning Council (the "A" 
agency). N.J.S.A. 26:2H-2(f). While it was there pend-
ing, the [*28] then Acting Commissioner of Health pur-
sued further merger discussions with St. Vincent's and 
Montclair Community, again to no avail. On September 
27, 1974 the A agency recommended denial of both 
the St. Vincent's and the Montclair Community ap-
plications on grounds that Essex County was already 
overbedded by 170 medical-surgical beds and that no 
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need existed for two "acute general hospitals" in West 
Essex. In recommending denial the A agency noted that 
merger discussions had taken place and recommended 
that the B agency and the Department of Health "work 
together to insure a certificate of need that will best meet 
the health care needs in the Montclair-West Essex area." 
On October 7, 1974, following receipt of the rec-
ommendations of both the B and A agencies, the 
Commissioner of Health recommended denial of the ap-
plication on the same grounds relied upon by the A 
agency. St. Vincent's sought reconsideration of this 
recommendation, in part relying upon a then-existing 
administrative regulation, N.J.A.C. 8:32-9.3(a): 
* * * a project involving the replacement of an existing 
facility shall not be subject to a bed need criterion by 
service in the certificate of need review process in those 
cases where the replacement facility proposes to replace 
beds up to the rated capacity by service which existed in 
the original facility. 
The requests for reconsideration were forwarded by 
the Department to the A agency, which on January 
31, 1975 determined that under the regulation it could 
not consider the bed need criterion in judging the St. 
Vincent's application; it thereupon reversed its ear-
lier determination and recommended approval of that 
application. This recommendation was forwarded to 
the Commissioner who once again attempted to initiate 
merger discussions between St. Vincent's and Montclair 
Community, which once again aborted. Again the 
Commissioner recommended denial of the St. Vincent's 
application, this time on the basis of a number of reasons 
set forth in a letter addressed to St. Vincent's on April 
24, 1975. 
[*29] Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 26:2H-9 St. Vincent's 
demanded a hearing. Following extensive hearings con-
ducted between July 16, 1975 and February 11, 1976, 
the hearing officer on June 24, 1976 rendered a lengthy 
report which specifically addressed the reasons for denial 
set forth in the Commissioner's April 24, 1975 letter. 
The hearing officer found each of the reasons given by 
the Commissioner unsupported by the record and there-
fore recommended that the HCAB approve St. Vincent's 
application. 
The HCAB considered the report of the hearing officer 
at its meeting of August 5, 1976, and voted to deny the 
St. Vincent's application. N.J.S.A. 26:2H-9. The rea-
sons given by the HCAB were precisely those set forth 
by the Commissioner in her April 24, 1975 letter, stated 
in virtually the same language. At the request of St. 
Vincent's the HCAB reviewed its decision after receiv-
ing copies of the documents introduced at the hearing, 
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but on November 4, 1976 it determined not to revise its 
conclusions. This appeal followed. 
St. Vincent's advances four challenges to the HCAB 
action: (1) that the HCAB based its denial "on facts 
not reflected in the record" and failed to make ade-
quate factual findings to support that denial; (2) that 
at its August 5, 1976 meeting in which the denial was 
voted, the HCAB improperly permitted the Department 
to present witnesses, exhibits and argument and denied 
St. Vincent's a similar opportunity; (3) that the denial 
arose from the Department's effort to force a merger 
between St. Vincent's and Montclair Community and 
that it therefore unconstitutionally impairs St. Vincent's 
freedom of religious expression, [**1155] and (4) that 
the denial was voted "for patently arbitrary and unrea-
sonable and capricious reasons." 
We find ourselves unable to address the substantive is-
sues presented, for we conclude that the findings of fact 
and conclusions of law of the HCAB are insufficient for 
review of the denial on the merits. Judicial review of 
such an administrative decision requires our passing on 
whether [*30] it is "supported by substantial credible ev-
idence and is neither arbitrary nor capricious." Guerrero 
v. Burlington Cty. Memorial Hosp., 70 N.J. 344, 356 
(1976). In order to consider those questions we must 
have a clear statement from the administrative agency as 
to the basis for its decision. Our Supreme Court stated 
this principle succinctly in In re Plainfield-Union Water 
Co., 11 N.J. 382(1953): 
The courts cannot exercise their duty of review unless 
they are advised of the considerations underlying the ac-
tion under review. The orderly functioning of the pro-
cess of review requires that the grounds upon which 
the administrative agency acted be "clearly disclosed 
and adequately sustained." Securities and Exchange 
Commission v. Chenery Corporation, 318 U.S. 80, 63 
S. Ct. 454, 87L. Ed. 626 (1943). "The administrative 
process will best be vindicated by clarity in its exercise;" 
judicial review demands that there be "clear indication" 
that the administrative authority "has exercised the dis-
cretion" with which it has been endowed. Phelps Dodge 
Corporation v. National Labor Relations Board, 313 
U.S. 177, 61 S. Ct. 845, 85 L. Ed. 1271, 133 A.L.R. 
1217 (1941). It is in this wise that conformance to the 
statutory standard of conduct can be secured, [at 396] 
See also, Weston v. N.J. State Bd. of Optometrists, 32 
N.J. Super. 502 (App. Div. 1954). 
These principles are set forth in statutory provisions 
and administrative regulations as well. N.J.A.C. 8:3-
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3.1 provides that proceedings of the Department are 
to be governed by the Administrative Procedure Act, 
N.J.S.A. 52:14B-1 et seq. Accordingly, upon the con-
clusion of the proceedings before him the hearing officer 
was required to submit findings of fact and conclusions 
of law. N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10(c). In making its determi-
nation the HCAB was required to limit its consideration 
to the record made before the hearing officer (N.J.S.A. 
52:14B-9; N.J.A.C. 8:43D-1.9), which record includes 
the recommended report and decision of the hearing of-
ficer. N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10(c). In rendering its decision, 
the HCAB was required to set forth its own "findings of 
fact and conclusions of law, separately stated." N.J.S.A. 
52:14B-10(d). 
[*31] The reasons for denial by the HCAB of the St. 
Vincent's application set forth in the August 16, 1976 
letter fall far short of meeting the statutory requirement 
of "findings of fact and conclusions of law, separately 
stated." The reasons there given are precisely the same 
as those given by the Commissioner in support of her 
recommendation of denial on April 24, 1975, before the 
hearing was even demanded. Thus, the record is en-
tirely barren of any indication as to how, if at all, the 
HCAB evaluated the proofs before the hearing officer or 
his report and recommendations. Indeed, our review of 
the transcript of the HCAB meeting of August 5, 1976 
at which the denial was voted persuades us that no ade-
quate evaluation was made by the HCAB of the record 
before the hearing officer or his conclusions. 
The Department urges that a culling of the record by 
this court would disclose sufficient credible evidence 
to support the HCAB findings and that they therefore 
should be sustained. See Close v. Kordulak Bros., 
44 N.J. 589 (1965); Nat'l Nephrology Foundation v. 
Dougherty, 138 N.J. Super. 470 (App. Div. 1976). But 
the sufficiency of evidence "must take into account what-
ever in the record fairly detracts from its weight"; the 
test is not for the courts "to read only one side of the case 
and, if they find any evidence there, the administrative 
action is to be sustained and the record to the contrary 
is to be ignored." Universal Camera Corp. [**1156] 
v. Labor Bd., 340 U.S. 474, 481, 488, 71 S. Ct. 456, 
461, 464, 95 L. Ed. 456 (1951). Here the absence of 
any statement by the HCAB as to how it weighed the 
proofs before the hearing officer and his findings leaves 
us without any guide to determine the sufficiency of the 
evidence or the adequacy of its evaluation by the HCAB. 
Cf. Weston v. N.J. State Bd. of Optometrists, supra. 
In Universal Camera Corp. v. Labor Bd., supra, 
Justice Frankfurter cogently described why evaluation 
of a hearing officer's conclusions is essential in deter-
mining whether a [*32] contrary agency conclusion is 
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supported by sufficient evidence: 
* * * evidence supporting a conclusion may be less sub-
stantial when an impartial experienced examiner who has 
observed the witnesses and lived with the case has drawn 
conclusions different from the Board's than when he has 
reached the same conclusion. The findings of the exam-
iner are to be considered along with the consistency and 
inherent probability of testimony. [340 U.S. at 496, 71 
S. Ct. at 469] 
The vulnerability of an administrative determination 
which does not specifically explain its rejection of a con-
trary finding of a hearing officer has been discussed in 
a number of recent cases. In Greater Boston Television 
Corp. v. F.C.C., 143 US. App. DC. 383, 444 F. 2d 
841 (DC. Cir. 1971), cert. den. 403 U.S. 923, 91 S. 
Ct. 2229, 2233, 29 L Ed. 2d 701 (1971), reh. den. 
404 U.S. 877, 92 S. Ct. 30, 30 L. Ed. 2d 125 (1971), 
where the administrative agency had rejected the find-
ings of a hearing examiner, Judge Leventhal discussed 
both the court's review of the administrative determina-
tion and the manner in which the agency must evaluate 
the findings of the examiner: 
The function of the court is to assure that the agency has 
given reasoned consideration to all the material facts and 
issues. This calls for insistence that the agency articu-
late with reasonable clarity its reasons for decision, and 
identify the significance of the crucial facts, a course 
that tends to assure that the agency's policies effectu-
ate general standards, applied without unreasonable dis-
crimination. 
* * * 
The Examiner's decision is part of the record, and the 
record must be considered as a whole in order to see 
whether the result is supported by substantial evidence. 
The agency's departures from the Examiner's findings 
are vulnerable if they fail to reflect attentive considera-
tion to the Examiner's decision. Yet in the last analysis 
it is the agency's function, not the Examiner's, to make 
the findings of fact and select the ultimate decision, and 
where there is substantial evidence supporting each re-
sult it is the agency's choice that governs. Here, the 
Commission accepted the Examiner's findings and con-
clusions to a substantial degree; and when it did not, the 
Commission made clear not only its awareness of what 
the [*33] Examiner had concluded, but also its reasons 
for taking a different course. [143 US. App. D.C. at 
393, 395, 444 F. 2d at 851, 853] 
In Local No. 441, Int'l Bro. of Electrical Wkrs. v. 
N.L.R.B., 167US. App. D.C. 53, 510F 2d 1274 (D.C. 
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Cir. 1975), the court remanded for further findings a de-
termination of the National Labor Relations Board which 
rejected the conclusions of an administrative law judge, 
stating the following reasons: 
Assuming for discussion, that the Board intended to dif-
fer with the [administrative law judge] it was incumbent 
upon the Board first to identify expressly an awareness 
that it was disagreeing with the ALJ, especially on a 
point where he had credited one witness over another, 
and second, to set forth the basis of disagreement with 
the ALJ so that we may determine whether the Board's 
finding is supported by substantial evidence in the record 
as a whole. [167 U.S. App. DC. at 55, 510 F. 2d at 
1276] 
See also, Alabama Ass1'n of Ins. A. v. Bd. of Gov. of 
F.R. System, 533 F. 2d 224 (5 Cir. 1976); Brennan v. 
Giles & Cotting, Inc., 504 F. 2d 1255 (4 Cir. 1974). 
[**1157] For like reasons we find it necessary to 
remand the matter for the HCAB to make "findings of 
fact and conclusions of law, separately stated" (N.J.S.A. 
52:14B-10(d)) with respect to the entire record, includ-
ing the proofs before, and the report and recommenda-
tions of, the hearing examiner. 
With respect to the proceedings on remand, we note 
that the hearing officer found that the Department had 
stipulated that "bed need was not a criterion in this case"; 
that by subsequent letter of June 1, 1976 the Department 
took the position that "bed need is a proper element for 
consideration," and that in the view of the hearing of-
ficer "it would be improper to consider it at this time." 
The stipulation appears to have been made because of 
N.J.A.C. 8:32-9.3, discussed above, which provided 
that a replacement facility "shall not be subject to a bed 
need criterion by service." That regulation was repealed 
during the course of the hearings below. N.J.A.C. 8:33-
1.1(c). Yet lack of bed need was [*34] recited as a 
reason for denial in the letter of August 16, 1976. 
Similarly, it appears that St. Vincent's presented 
no proofs before the hearing examiner as to possible 
merger of facilities or institutions in reliance upon a 
July 23, 1974 letter from the Department advising that 
the Commissioner had determined "that the merger of 
your institution and Montclair Hospital will not be a 
consideration in the determination of your request for 
a Certificate of Need." The hearing officer accordingly 
found that merger "was to be excluded as a topic" from 
the hearing. The August 16, 1976 letter cites as another 
reason for denial, however, that "comprehensive appli-
cation" jointly with another institution "has not been 
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adequately considered." 
The statutory criteria for the issuance of a certificate 
of need include consideration of "(a) the availability of 
facilities or services which may serve as alternatives or 
substitutes, (b) the need for special equipment and ser-
vices in the area, and (c) the possible economies and 
improvement in services to be anticipated from the op-
eration of joint central services." N.J.S.A. 26:2H-8. In 
view of this legislative mandate it would be inappropri-
ate to require that on the remand the HCAB evaluate 
the application without reference to such criteria. Cf. 
Cooper River Convalescent Center v. Dougherty, 133 
N.J. Super. 226, 233 (App. Div. 1975); Merry Heart 
Nurs. and Conv. Home v. Dougherty, 131 N.J. Super. 
412, 419 (App. Div. 1974). But it would be equally 
inappropriate to permit the HCAB to utilize such criteria 
without giving St. Vincent's the opportunity to present 
evidence and argument bearing on them. See N.J.S.A. 
52:14B-9; cf. In re Application of Union Community 
Bank, 144 N.J. Super. 39 (App. Div. 1976). 
Accordingly, on the remand both St. Vincent's and 
the Department shall have the opportunity to supple-
ment the record before the hearing officer with respect 
to the issues of bed need and merger of facilities or 
institutions. If either [*35] or both of the parties so 
request, the HCAB shall remand the matter to the hear-
ing officer for the purpose of supplementing the record 
as to those issues, whereupon the hearing officer shall 
file his supplemental findings of fact and conclusions of 
law and his recommendations. The findings and conclu-
sions required of the HCAB by our remand shall be based 
upon the present record, as it may be thus supplemented. 
N.J.S.A. 52:14B-9. 
In order to avoid prolonging this already extended 
proceeding, we fix the following time schedule: by 
November 12, 1977 the parties shall advise the HCAB as 
to whether they wish to supplement the record before the 
hearing officer; if supplemental hearings are requested, 
they shall be completed, and the hearing officer's report 
filed, by January 16, 1978, and the HCAB shall render 
its findings of fact and conclusions of law by February 
17, 1978; if no supplemental hearings are requested, the 
HCAB shall render its findings by December 15, 1977. 
One further matter concerning the remand requires 
comment. St. Vincent's contends that it was deprived 
of a fair hearing before the HCAB because both the 
Commissioner, an ex officio member of the [**1158] 
HCAB, and Joseph Slavin, director of the B agency, 
were permitted to make presentations to the Board while 
representatives of St. Vincent's were prohibited from 
doing so. We are not prepared to conclude from the 
record before us that the HCAB permitted material be-
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yond the record to be presented to it; clearly the HCAB 
may not expand the record without giving the applicant 
the opportunity to participate and respond. N.J.S.A. 
52:14B-9. But even in the absence of an expansion of 
the record, in this unusual administrative setting where 
the Commissioner, whose recommendation is the sub-
ject of the hearing, is herself a member of the reviewing 
body, fairness in fact and appearance requires that the 
HCAB permit the applicant to respond appropriately to 
any statement made by the Commissioner in support of 
her recommendation. Cf. Mazza v. Cavicchia, 15 NJ. 
498 (1954); [*36] NJ. State Bd. of Optometrists v. 
Nemitz, 21 NJ. Super. 18 (App. Div. 1952). 
The denial of the certificate of need is reversed and the 
matter is remanded to the HCAB for proceedings con-
sistent with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction. 
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